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Purpose: The aim of this article is to identify which solutions reducing the contagion effect 
applied during the first global financial crisis in the 21st century may be treated as universal 
and as such – be also implemented during the crisis caused by the coronavirus pandemic.  
Design/Methodology/Approach: Literature analysis, the theoretical foundations of the 
contagion effect and the analysis of financial and historical data were used as the research 
method.  
Findings: The impact of the contagion effect on the course and scale of the financial crisis 
depends on many factors and circumstances, which differ in respect of a country and 
additionally change in time, in spite of the fact that the system of disorder impulse 
transmission is universal and includes four basic channels, namely liquidity (repo 
transactions and unsecured financing), assets and public debt channel. 
Practical Implications: The combination of administrative tools (e.g., introduction of a 
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considerably reduce the role of the liquidity channel in the contagion effect transmission. 
Non-standard banking activity on the government securities markets led to the reduction of 
sovereign bonds margins, thus contributing to the limitation of contagion effect thought the 
public debt channel.  
Originality/Value: The article specifically indicated and evaluated the shock transmission 
channels and contagion effects between countries and markets and between banks through 
the interbank market (taking into account the differences and specific character of the 
secured and unsecured lending market). Also, operations and strategic methods for reducing 
the contagion effect were proposed. 
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The second half of 2020 was focused on preventing the spread of the SARS-CoV-2 
virus causing a COVID-19 pandemic which led to the second global economic crisis 
in the 21st century. This time, however, unlike in the case of the crisis which started 
in 2008, the crunch was not triggered by the financial sector, which infected the real 
economy but by a pandemic disease, which led to an economic crisis and 
subsequently to the turmoil on the financial markets. The scale and dimension of this 
disorder as well as the real transmission mechanism and mutual interaction between 
the segments of the financial market will certainly be observed, investigated and 
hotly disputed in the years to come. Nonetheless, the phenomena which occurred 
during the first global financial crisis of the 21st century, which broke out in 2008, 
should be summarized today. Despite a different casus belli, some mechanisms and 
effects observed during the global financial crisis in the years 2008-2014 are 
universal. Better understood, they may help us take steps which will reduce the scale 
and effects of the current crisis. As in the case of the coronavirus – the primary 
source of the present crisis – the key element we should carefully look at is the way 
the disorder spreads and infects other, so far sound segments and financial markets. 
Unable to change the history, we should try to limit the effects of the crisis by firm, 
but first and foremost thoughtful action and we should implement mechanisms 
which will prevent the subsequent waves of the crisis from spreading even if one of 
the markets suffers a breakdown due to fundamental reasons.  
 
The diverse form and structure of financial markets in major world economies 
essentially prevents the crises – due to their different origins – from affecting all the 
markets in the world at the same time. Naturally, this statement is true only if the 
cause of the crisis is not very complex and refers only to one or some aspects of the 
financial market operation in a given country. However, in the case of complex 
reasons for the crisis and due to the interdependencies existing between the markets, 
the disorder will affect all the most important economies regardless of the structure 
of their financial markets. Moreover, during the last global financial crisis, banks all 
over the world experienced the contagion effect in a short time, despite the fact that 
some months before the safety net institutions in different countries publicly assured 
that their banking sectors have a good standing and are resistant to the turmoil on the 
global markets. 
 
The aim of this article is to identify which solutions reducing the contagion effect 
applied during the first global financial crisis in the 21st century may be treated as 
universal and as such – be also implemented during the crisis caused by the 
coronavirus pandemic. Due to the complex character of contagion effects in the 
modern banking system, this article will specifically indicate and evaluate the shock 
transmission channels and contagion effects between countries and markets and 
between banks through the interbank market (taking into account the differences and 
specific character of the secured and unsecured lending market). Also, operations 
and strategic methods for reducing the contagion effect will be proposed. 
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2.  The Role of Contagion Effect in Financial Crisis Escalation: A 
Theoretical Approach 
 
Analysis of the origins of the last global financial crisis has shown that they involved 
both the factors which, historically, had been the cause of many financial crises (e.g., 
increase of asset value, credit boom, lack of appropriate regulations) and new 
elements of which an increase in interdependencies between the segments of the 
financial markets played a significant role, both on the national and international 
level. Investigating the impact of the interdependencies between the banks on the 
stability of the entire system, it should be noted that such an assessment is not 
unambiguous. If there is no significant disorder on the market, the interdependencies 
between the banks render the system more resistant to single shocks. However, if 
multiple shocks occur simultaneously, it is the well-developed interdependencies 
network that causes a rapid spread of problems and poses a threat to the stability of 
the entire sector (Vitali, Battiston, and Gallegati, 2016). This was the case of casus 
belli of the first global financial crisis of the 21st century, namely the collapse of the 
US Lehman Brothers investment bank.  
 
Despite the fact that the bank was „only” the fourth largest such an entity in the US, 
with asset value exceeding “only” USD 630 billion, the bankruptcy decision caused 
a global domino effect due to the bank’s interdependencies with the national and 
international capital market (Uittenbogaard, 2015). The exceptional character of risk 
in the banking system affects the entire real sphere, which is not the case of risk 
materialized in other sectors of economy. During the last global financial crisis, the 
financial sector, both directly and indirectly (through the contagion effect and 
feedback loop) was responsible for two thirds of the decrease in volume of 
production in real economy (Iacoviello, 2015). The power of contagion effect grew 
as the parallel changes of asset value on the financial markets got bigger.  
 
Similarly to the spread of a pandemic disease, the occurrence and power of 
contagion effects in the banking sector depends on the distance between the infected 
and healthy organisms. Naturally, contrary to the spread of the virus, it is not a 
physical (geographical) but an institutional and regulatory distance that matters. 
Lack of transport costs of banking services makes them an apparently ideal subject 
of globalisation. In practice, however, due to the importance of banking, which is the 
lifeblood of every economy, the system enjoys special protection of the state.  
 
Geographical distance is insignificant when banking sectors in different countries 
are based on the same regulatory and institutional foundations, which may contribute 
to the reduction of systemic risk in banking (Seikel, 2014). On the other hand, 
integration of different countries within political and economic organizations may 
enhance the contagion effect in result of the action which is favourable from an 
economic perspective of a given country (Dong, Cumming, and Guariglia, 2015). 
Improved competitiveness inside political and economic organizations (e.g., 
European Union), however, heightened the contagion effect in the banking sectors of 
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different countries due to the fact that they were forced to keep up with more 
competitive banks from other countries sooner than they would have had to do 
otherwise.  
 
In the literature, there is no broad agreement about the relations between the 
structure of interdependencies on the financial market and the occurrence of the 
contagion effect. According to some, it is the incomplete character of the 
interdependencies on the financial market that is the source of instability and causes 
the contagion effect, since banks in particular are vulnerable to the obligations of a 
number of financial institutions. A more developed interdependencies network, 
which reduces bank exposure to one business partner, would be therefore less 
vulnerable to a systemic crisis. Some other propose a hypothesis that it was the 
excessive interdependencies network between institutions on the financial market 
that significantly contributed to its instability, due to the possibility of easy spread of 
financial problems as well as problems related to the insolvency of one institution, 
whose impact on the remaining part of the system is similar to that of a pandemic 
disease (Acemoglu, Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Salehi, 2015).  
 
However, it has been demonstrated that it is not our knowledge of the structure of 
interdependencies between the financial market participants that is key, but the 
parameters of individual knots in such an interdependencies network, i.e., banks 
(Glasserman and Young, 2015). The contagion effect is the greatest when the banks 
in the network are of similar size, use high leverage and a large part of their 
obligations belongs to other banks in the same network. However, the structure of 
interdependencies becomes important when the cost of bankruptcy and decrease in 
the market quality of assets is taken into account. Other studies prove that it is 
possible to shape the interdependencies in such a way that the contagion effect will 
not occur (Babus, 2016).  
 
Apart from the contagion effect within the banking sector, we should remember that 
it also occurs between the financial market and the public finance sector. The scale 
of this effect in many countries during the last global financial crisis was greater 
than the transmission of disorders through the interbank sector. It should also be 
noted that the contagion effect affects the public finance as well, which means that 
the problems in public finance on the national level may first be transferred onto a 
regional level and only then – infect the financial markets. It was the events 
connected with the public debt in some countries, and consequently the increase in 
credit risk in a country that generated the contagion effects in the whole region.  
 
Two channels of impact and transmission of a country’s credit risk onto the risk 
level in the global financial system can be identified. Firstly, significant events 
connected with the public debt have an instantaneous effect on the risk bonus in the 
neighbouring countries, although this impact may also be global at times. Secondly, 
there exists a slower process which causes that such an event creates regional and 
global risk factors. It can be therefore concluded that global risk factors result from 
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the investors’ appetite for risk and the level of the national debt in a country, while 
the regional factors depend on the economic foundation of the countries in a given 
region (Wu, Erdem, Kalotychou, and Remolona, 2016).  
 
In terms of the role of contagion effect in financial crisis escalation, no less 
important is the level of banking sector development. In the countries where the 
system is better developed, banks have better leverage, which makes them more 
vulnerable to the problems of public finance in the country of origin. This is due to 
the fact that they have greater exposure to government bonds, treating them as 
liquidity reserves. However, in the case of public finance crisis, or even bankruptcy 
of a country, it is there that the biggest decrease in credit availability for real 
economy will occur and banking sector crisis will be deeper (Gennaioli, Martin, and 
Rossi, 2014). During the last global financial crisis, in peripheral euro-zone 
countries, the increase in profitability of government securities, however, led to an 
increase in their share in bank portfolios in these countries. Rise in credit risk of the 
countries triggered significant increase of risk in the banking sectors where the share 
of more risky securities in the portfolio did not decrease but rose.  
 
Summing up the results of the study on the contagion effect role in financial crisis 
escalation, it should be noted that while the scale of its impact depends on many 
factors and circumstances, which differ with regard to the country and additionally 
change in time, the system of disorder impulse transmission is universal and 
encompasses four basic channels: liquid (repo transactions and unsecured financing), 
assets and public debt (Table 1). 
 
Table 1. Transmission platforms and channels of contagion effect transmission  
Transmission 
platforms 





Liquid (repo transactions) Breakdown of interbank market  
Liquid (unsecured financing) 
Assets Decrease in asset market value  
Public finance 
sector 
Public debt  Deterioration in public finance, rise in 
government securities related risk  
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
3. Main Channels of Contagion Effect Transmission 
 
Liquid channel – repo transactions: 
One of the two key segments of the interbank market, through which the contagion 
effect is transmitted is the repo transactions market. Repo markets (including reverse 
repo transactions) play an essential role in ensuring liquidity of the banking system. 
Additionally, they make it possible to exchange the securities held in order to change 
the risk profile of the securities portfolio (Committee on the Global Financial 
System, 2017). Vulnerability of the repo transactions market to disorders, and thus 
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the ease of contagion effect transmission results from the rules binding on these 
markets, especially in the US. In the United States, bankruptcy law envisages that 
the lender in repo transaction may instantaneously liquidate the securities accepted 
as security in case its business partner files for bankruptcy (Baklanova, Copeland, 
and McCaughrin, 2015). This rule is one of the main factors which contribute to the 
development of repo market as the main source of financing for many actors on the 
financial market. At the same time, it raises concerns that a collapse of such a big 
bank, which financed itself by repo transactions, will trigger automatic sale of 
securities through the entities which extended financing to the bank. This situation 
will lead to an abrupt revaluation of these securities, which in turn will provoke their 
massive, fire sale by other banks which possess them.  
 
Thus, apparently unconnected entities will incur losses due to the fact that they hold 
the same securities, which – when used in a repo transaction made by other banks – 
could have been immediately liquidated on the markets because of the collapse of 
the lending bank in this transaction. This means – paradoxically – that regulations 
which are supposed to increase liquidity and safety of secured loans, in special 
circumstances, may lead to the collapse of prices of securities used in this kind of 
operations (Antinolfi, Carapella, Kahn, Martin, Mills, and Nosal, 2015).  
 
Despite so significant potential threat to financial stability, which repo market could 
generate, it must be said that we cannot call the disorders which occurred on this 
market during the last financial crisis the run on repo. In the main segment of this 
market, the margin level and value of transactions were stable for most borrowers 
during the crisis (with the exception of the sudden drop in Lehman Brothers 
financing in September 2008) (Copeland, Martin, and Walker, 2014). On the 
American market, at the peak  of the crisis (between Q2 2007 and Q1 2009) the 
value of repo transactions which involved assets secured securities decreased only 
by USD 182 billion while the total value of assets secured securities – as short-term 
sources of financing – dropped by as much as USD 1.4 billion. Only in the case of 
repo transactions which involved corporate bonds, their decrease (USD 116 billion) 
accounted for approx. 60% of the decrease in the total value of corporate bonds, as 
short-term sources of financing, which totalled USD 196 billion (Krishnamurthy, 
Nagel and Orlov, 2014). 
 
Liquid capital – unsecured financing:  
While indicating the disorders on the interbank market as one of the channels of 
contagion effect transmission, it should be remembered that liquidity problems on 
the unsecured financing market appear at the same time as liquidity problems on the 
secured financing market occur, and then they aggravate each other. The scale of 
contagion effect results from the scale of banks’ interdependence through the 
interbank market. Still at the beginning of this century, it was indicated that the 
interdependencies lead to risk diversification rather than contribute to the spread of 
the contagion effect. However, in result of the recent global financial crisis it was 
agreed that both a lack of interdependences and excessive interdependences are not 
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proper while individual risk diversification increases systemic risk since banks are 
both lenders and borrowers (Battiston, Gatti, Gallegati, Greenwald, and Stiglitz, 
2012). The scale of contagion effect also depends on the market structure, which, as 
studies have shown, is not flat but multi-level, which means that most banks do not 
lend to each other directly but through intermediating banks (Craig and Von Peter, 
2014). Thus, the contagion effect will not be counteracted by the banks enjoying 
liquidity offering support to the banks with shortage of liquidity through the 
interbank market.  
 
It should also be noted that the interbank market still has a national, and not global 
character, which was particularly visible during the last global financial crisis in 
respect of the branches of European banks operating in the United States. These 
branches were forced to restrict their credit activity in the US, which resulted from 
the fact that they financed their American activity not from deposits collected in the 
US, but with the help of monetary market local funds. When the crisis of public 
finance broke out in the euro-zone countries, these funds withdrew their financing 
and the parent banks from Europe were not able to supply suitable financing in 
American currency. Thus, these branches had to limit their credit activity on the 
American market.  
 
Asset channel: 
The experience of the last global financial crisis has shown that the contagion effect 
on the interbank market spreads also by a fire sale of assets. Simulations 
demonstrated that if the asset value decreases by 1% in one of the five largest 
American bank holdings, the contagion effect – by the fire sale of assets – will cause 
losses in the entire banking system whose value reaches up to 2% of the total capital 
of all banks. Interestingly, this result was obtained assuming lack of disorders in 
market liquidity. Should these occur, the contagion effect would have caused a few 
times bigger losses (Duarte and Eisenbach, 2019). The impact of the contagion 
effect depends – among others – on the scale of heterogeneity of banks’ balance 
sheets, whose increase is deemed to be one of the key elements contributing to the 
spread of the systemic crisis (Anand, Gai, Kapadia, Brennan, and Willison, 2013).  
 
Analysis of mutual exposures between 54 largest European banks during the last 
global financial crisis has shown that exposures in the form of securities had the 
greatest share in this group (30%). Nonetheless, 80% of exposure value was 
concentrated in 18 banks. The biggest concentration was recorded in the case of non-
balance sheet exposures (80% of their value was located in 6 banks only) although 
they accounted for only 14% of the value of mutual exposures among all the banks 
under consideration (Aldasoro and Alves, 2018). 
 
However, analysing the spread of the contagion effect through the asset channel, we 
should remember that the problem of fire asset sale should not be associated with a 
significant decrease in the value of assets held by the bank. Inasmuch as the decrease 
in asset value is one of the key assumptions used to define banks’ resistance to 
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external shocks, the fire asset sale does not have to directly contribute to degradation 
of the situation of a given bank. The decisive element will be bank flexibility in the 
order of selling the assets, starting with those most liquid. Naturally, in the context 
of a systemic crisis and death of interbank market, even drastic reduction of assets 
sale prices does not have to ensure their sale (Greenwood, Landier, and Thesmar, 
2015).  
 
Public debt channel: 
It should be remembered that bank crises are not the only kind of crisis which may 
affect the economy of a country, a group of countries or a region. There may also 
occur e.g. parallel currency or debt crises. At the same time, any combination of 
these crises may take place or even all of them may occur simultaneously (Babecký, 
Havránek, Matějů, Rusnák, Šmídková, and Vašíček, 2014). However, the experience 
of the last two decades of the 20th century showed that a bank crisis understood as a 
situation where significant financial difficulty is manifested in the banking system 
and important intervention measures are undertaken by public institutions, was a 
result of bankruptcy of the country, not its cause. Bankruptcy of the  country led to 
the banking crisis among others in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, 
Romania, Slovenia and in the Ukraine (Table 2). 
 
Table 2. Bank crises in the last two decades of the 20th century in European 
countries, caused by bankruptcy of these countries  
Country Outbreak of financial crisis Bankruptcy of the country 




Bulgaria 1996 1990 
Romania 1990 1986 
Slovenia 1992 1992 
Ukraine 1998 1998 
Source: Own study based on Gennaioli, N., Martin, A., Rossi, S. 2014. Sovereign Default, 
Domestic Banks, and Financial Institutions. Journal of Finance, 69(2), 819-866. DOI: 
10.1111/jofi.12124. 
 
Contagion of the banking system with problems resulting from a public finance 
crisis also occurred during the last global financial crisis. This time, however, a 
reverse phenomenon could be observed, where the banking crisis may lead to the 
collapse of public finance. This effect was particularly visible in such countries as 
Ireland or Spain, where public aid granted to those banks caused a public finance 
crisis. Liquidity and solvency problems in the banking sector led to a crisis 
connected with public debt, which required external aid in order to limit it. 2 
 
Nevertheless, the aid proved insufficient to protect the country from debt 
restructuring. Let us take Greece as an example. Although in 2010 it became a 
beneficiary of the historically largest aid programme, developed jointly by the 
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European Union and the International Monetary Fund, Greece had to restructure its 
debt in 2012 anyway. However inevitable debt crisis enforced by markets for Greece 
suffering from bad domestic governance at the end of 2009 (Thalassinos and 
Stamatopoulos, 2015). 
 
The first global financial crisis of the 21st century has shown that the contagion 
effect between the financial system and public finance is a more complicated process 
and has a two-directional character. Insolvency of a country may cause a banking 
crisis since banks hold a large portfolio of government bonds. However, aid granted 
by a country to the banking sector, both by capitalization and by guarantees, may 
limit the short-term liquidity of the government sector and trigger a public debt crisis 
(Yu, 2017). Government guarantees and aid programmes for the financial sector 
were effective in short-term but they soon led to the feedback loop effect. 
 
Analyses carried out after the culmination of the crisis demonstrated however that in 
the years 2008-2013 most of the contagion effect cases (approx. 63%) originated in 
the banking sector and occurred from banks to countries. While in France, Greece 
and Ireland the effect was unidirectional, in Portugal and the Netherlands it 
accounted for 70% of the cases (Singh, Gómez-Puig, and Sosvilla-Rivero, 2016). On 
average, during the first three years from the outbreak of the financial crisis, when 
public aid and other forms of government’s support were involved in solving the 
problem, public sector debt rose by 86% (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2011).  
 
This data therefore means that the main source of the turmoil lied in banks, which 
had an adverse impact on the fiscal situation of the countries due to the public aid 
they obtained. In the case of Belgium and Finland, the situation was opposite since it 
was the banks that suffered from the decreasing value of sovereign bonds and higher 
cost of financing. The third group of the countries included Spain, Italy and Austria, 
where a similar number of events occurred in both directions, creating a clear 
feedback loop between the situation of public finance and the banking sector (Table 
3). 
 
Table 3. Direction of contagion effect between the banking sector and public finance 
sector in the euro-zone countries  
Direction of contagion effect 
banks – public finance  public finance – banks 
Austria, Finland, Netherlands 
Q4 2008 – Q1 2009 
Spain, Italy 
Q2 2009 – Q3 kw. 2009 
France, Netherlands 
Q2 2009 – Q3 2009 
Austria, Belgium, Finland, Spain, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Italy 
Q4 2009 – Q3 2011 
Austria, France, Greece, Spain, Ireland, 
Portugal, Italy 
Q42009 – Q32011 
Spain, Netherlands 
Q4 2011 – Q2 2012 
Austria, France, Greece, Netherlands, 
Ireland, Portugal, Italy 
Finland, Italy 
Q3 2012 – Q3 2013 
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Q4 2011 – Q2 2012 
France, Netherlands, Spain, Portugal 
Q3 2012 – Q3 2013 
Source: Own study based on Singh, M.K., Gómez-Puig, M., Sosvilla-Rivero, S. 2016. 
Sovereign-bank linkages: Quantifying directional intensity of risk transfers in EMU 
countries. Journal of International Money and Finance, 63(C), 137-164. DOI: 
10.1016/j.jimonfin.2016.01.003. 
 
4. Methods of Limiting the Contagion Effect 
 
4.1 Operational Methods of Limiting the Contagion Effect 
 
A characteristic feature of the operational methods of limiting the contagion effect is 
the fact that they are introduced in response to disorders in order to prevent their 
spread. They are therefore ex post tools, and their operation has a specified duration. 
This time does not have to be precisely defined. There may be only an indication 
that a given instrument will be withdrawn once the threat to the market is eliminated, 
in the opinion of a safety net institution.  
 
During the last global financial crisis, one of such tools, which was supposed to limit 
the contagion effect transmission through the liquidity channel, was a temporary ban 
on sales of shares listed on stock exchange. These bans were introduced in 
September and in October 2008. They differed materially in different countries, 
however, in terms of their duration and scope. The ban in the US and Canada was 
the shortest, lasting only 19 days, while in most of the other countries it lasted for 
more than a year. The differences in the range of the ban referred mostly to the kind 
of shares – whether all of them or only those issued by the banks and other financial 
institutions were involved. The second criterion applied at that time referred to the 
fact whether the short-term sale was covered (i.e., the seller lent a given security or 
arranged for the loan), or naked (i.e., the seller did not lend a given security nor did 
he arrange for the loan) (Beber and Pagano, 2013).  
 
Another operational method of limiting the contagion effect through the liquidity 
channel was the liquidity provision, on an unprecedented scale, by central banks, 
which replaced liquidity on the interbank market and increased the liquidity 
provision on the interbank market in public debt-stricken countries (Greece, Italy 
and Spain) (Garcia de Andoain, Heider, Hoerova, and Manganelli, 2016). Another 
instrument involved central banks extending the scope of acceptable security 
accepted from the banks in connection with liquidity provision (Bindseil, 2013), 
e.g., the European Central Bank carried out such extension several times, which let 
the euro-zone banks obtain additional financing, unavailable on the interbank 
market.  
 
Limiting the contagion effect through public debt received as much attention as 
limiting the contagion effect through liquidity channel during the last crisis. In 
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particular, it involved non-standard operations undertaken by central banks on the 
government securities market, which were based e.g. on unconditional purchase of 
sovereign bonds of Greece, Portugal and Ireland (2010-2012) and Spain and Italy 
(2011-2012) by the European Central Bank (Zaleska, 2019). In result, the sovereign 
bonds margin in the countries participating in the programme decreased, thus 
contributing to the reduction of the contagion effect in the European banking system. 
The levels of profitability of government securities were less dependent on the fire 
sales of government securities with falling rating and on fire buys of government 
securities of the highest rating carried out by the banks in order to reduce the risk of 
the portfolio held or to obtain liquidity (Corsi, Lillo, Pirino, and Trapin, 2018). It 
was only thanks to the aid obtained by the peripheral euro-zone countries from the 
European Financial Stability Instrument that the feedback loop between the situation 
in the banking sector and the condition of public finance could be eliminated 
(Banerjeea, Hungb, and Lo, 2016). This two-directional transfer was broken only 
after the first aid programme extended to Greece.  
 
4.2 Strategic Methods of Limiting the Contagion Effect  
 
Substantial majority of the strategic methods of limiting the contagion effect, which 
were developed after the last global financial crisis, originated from or was based on 
systematic development of operational methods introduced on an ad hoc basis. This 
solution was applied among others in the case of restrictions on short-term sale. 
Operational restrictions in this area had already been applied in 2008 but only in 
2012 an EU regulation was issued to introduce uniform rules of short-term sale and 
the activities which supervisory bodies may undertake in respect of the short-term 
sale when financial stability is under threat. In case of a threat to financial stability, 
the supervisory bodies in the EU Member States were empowered to introduce a ban 
or a restriction on the short-term sale both in respect of transactions related to all the 
financial instruments, certain categories of financial instruments or a single specified 
financial instrument. Should a threat to the correct functioning and integrity of the 
financial market or to the stability of the EU banking system or its part occur, the 
European Securities and Markets Authority may take action independently.  
 
In as much as complex regulation of the short-term sale problem may limit the 
contagion effect transmission though the liquidity channel, it does not eliminate nor 
does it address the fundamental problem, i.e., the excessive complication and variety 
of interdependencies both between single banks (including combination of deposit 
and lending activity with investment activity) and the entire banking sectors on a 
global scale. The attempts supposed to reduce this fundamental problem, among 
others, led to the return to the conceptions which arose after the Great Depression 90 
years ago, which was manifested in the American Dodd-Frank Act (2010), British 
Vickers Report (2011), or the EU Liikanen Report (2012). It has to be noted, 
however, that implementation of changes which restore at least partial separation of 
deposit and lending activity from investment activity lost its initial impetus and so 
far, e.g., at the entire EU level, has not been implemented (Koleśnik and 
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Dąbkowska, 2020). Separation of deposit and lending activity from investment 
activity, leading to a lesser complexity of banks by depriving them of the option of 
speculation on capital market, offering insurance products or purchasing shares in 
non-financial enterprises, would limit the possibility of disorders spreading between 
the banks, but it will not eliminate it totally. The excessive complexity will not be 
reduced whenever the bank’s activity focuses solely on the deposit and lending area.  
 
Only a limitation of the scale of activity of individual banks which generate both 
national and global systemic risk – could be a solution. Experience of the last global 
financial crisis has shown, however, that the deleveraging process was transitional 
while the real solution to the problem could only be an intervention undertaken by a 
financial safety net institution, e.g. through division of banks into smaller entities, 
which will allow us to preserve their full usefulness, but will deprive them of their 
systemic importance.  
 
Despite the experience of the last global financial crisis, the above postulates 
concerning the scale of activity of individual banks have not been implemented on 
an international scale. Only the rules of identification of Global Systemically 
Important Banks (G-SIBs) were introduced, taking into account – in the criteria of 
their verification – among others, their cross-border activity, interdependencies with 
the financial system, interchangeability of services or financial infrastructure and 
complexity of the bank. Similarly, in the European Union, in the method of 
identification of Other Systemically Important Banks (O-SIBs), such parameters as 
the importance (including inter change ability of services), complexity, cross-border 
activity and interdependencies were taken into account. Unfortunately, neither on 
the global nor on the EU level, identification of Systemically Important Banks takes 
into consideration their involvement in providing services and operations in favour 
of the government of the country of origin, as well as the role of a bank in the 
settlement and accounting system (Allahrakha, Glasserman, and Young, 2015).  
 
A complementary postulate of strategic importance – whose implementation will 
allow us to limit the scale of potential contagion effect even before it occurs – is, 
apart from taking into account the abovementioned bank interdependency when 
identifying systemically important entities, the development of early warning 
systems. The structure of early warning systems in the case of systemic crises must 
include variables which were used before both in the systems warning against 
banking crises and the systems warning against debt crises. These variables must be 
able to include the potential of spread of disorders between the banking sector, 
financial markets (especially the securities market and currency market) and the 
public finance sector. In the systems of early warning against systemic crises, 
interdependencies between single entities and the infrastructural environment must 
be taken into consideration, as well as indicators of contagion between the financial 
market segments (Constantin, Peltonen, and Sarlin, 2018).  
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5.  Conclusion 
 
The SARS-CoV-2 pandemic which infected the world in the first quarter of 2020, 
leading to the second global economic crisis in the 21st century, left the question 
about the spread of contagion effect in the banking system still unanswered. When 
analysing the shock transmission channels and the contagion effect, we should 
remember that despite the globalization processes and integration of international 
financial markets, there are still material differences between the structure of 
financial markets in the most important world economies. Experience and 
observations made during the first global financial crisis in this century have given a 
lot of answers in this area. However, as the analysis carried out in this article shows, 
the problem is complex and not all the lessons we could learn during the last crisis 
brought about systemic, universal solutions, which would prove effective during the 
crises to come.  
 
The impact of the contagion effect on the course and scale of the financial crisis 
depends on many factors and circumstances, which differ in respect of a country and 
additionally change in time, in spite of the fact that the system of disorder impulse 
transmission is universal and includes four basic channels, namely liquidity (repo 
transactions and unsecured financing), assets and public debt channel. Experience 
has shown that a combination of administrative tools (e.g., introduction of a 
temporary ban on the short-term sale of shares listed on stock exchange) and central 
bank monetary policy instruments (e.g., practically unlimited access to liquidity for 
banks) may considerably reduce the role of the liquidity channel in the contagion 
effect transmission. Non-standard banking activity on the government securities 
markets led to the reduction of sovereign bonds margins, thus contributing to the 
limitation of contagion effect thought the public debt channel. 
 
Operational methods of ad hoc contagion effect reduction applied during the last 
global financial crisis have gradually become a basis for systemic solutions e.g. 
restrictions in respect of the short-term sale. Nevertheless, systemic solutions which 
would not only limit the scale of contagion effect at the moment of its occurrence 
but also materially reduce the potential of its occurrence are still missing. Analysis 
of the events of the last global financial crisis has shown that it is the large, universal  
banks combining deposit and lending activity with investment and insurance activity 
that play the key role in the transmission of contagion effects between individual 
countries and segments of the financial market.  
 
Therefore, identification of systemically important banks alone (on the global or 
local level), taking into account their complexity, cross-border activity or 
interdependencies or even the development of early warning system will not suffice. 
It is necessary to separate deposit and lending activity from investment banking 
activity, which will lead to the reduction of banks complexity and administrative 
reduction of the scale of activity of single banks. It should be noted, however, that 
the idea of separation of deposit and lending activity from investment banking 
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activity as well as forced limitation of the scale of activity of single banks must be 
further analysed in terms of its consistence not only from the point of view of 
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